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Extending Life Cycle Models of Optimal Portfolio Choice:  
Integrating Flexible Work, Endogenous Retirement, and 
 Investment Decisions with Lifetime Payouts 
 
Previous research on portfolio choice and retirement patterns has evolved from three 
sources. First, the finance literature has investigated how investors save and allocate their 
portfolios across available capital market assets, typically safe bonds and risky stocks.1 Yet 
most of these studies are silent on the links between labor supply and investment behavior. 
Second, a large Social Security literature has explored how older people alter their work 
patterns in response to system retirement incentives, but that research devotes little attention 
to saving and portfolio allocation patterns. And third, the longevity risk literature has 
examined how annuity payout products can help protect against outliving one’s income, but it 
has not yet explored how flexible labor supply might shape portfolio allocation and location 
decisions.  
The present paper seeks to unify these three strands in a model which integrates the 
decisionmaking process of a consumer seeking to optimally select her saving, consumption, 
work hours, retirement age, and investment patterns in a life cycle context, where she has 
access to both the capital market (stocks and bonds) and annuities. We contribute to the 
finance and pension literature by making the work/retirement decisions endogenous, as the 
consumer can adjust both her retirement date and her employment hours during her worklife. 
We also add value to the Social Security literature by making investment and annuitization 
decisions endogenous to the lifecycle work and retirement choice. From an individual’s asset-
liability perspective, we show how stochastic equity returns, uninsurable labor income shocks, 
and uncertain lifetimes help shape investment portfolio patterns.  
This is not the first analysis that makes labor supply endogenous over the life cycle in 
an investment context,2 but we extend prior research by integrating flexible work hours and 
retirement ages with uncertain mortality and uninsurable labor income paths to show how 
they influence consumption, saving, and portfolio choice paths. Using our realistically 
calibrated life cycle model, we derive optimal work and retirement behavior as well as 
consumption and investment patterns over stocks, bonds, and payout annuities.  Prior finance 
studies have assumed fixed retirement ages and predict that older people hold unrealistically 
high levels of equity; by contrast, we show that making labor supply endogenous and 
allowing purchase of payout annuities reduces older persons’ equity share and substantially 
                                                          
1 See for instance Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) and Chacko and Viceira (2006). 
2 See for instance Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008), Polkovnichenko (2007), Chan and Viceira (2000) and 
Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992).  
 2
increases work effort of the young – compatible with real-world evidence. We then illustrate 
how introducing annuities generates even more realistic models which permit earlier 
retirement and higher financial market participation by the elderly.  Incorporating an age-
dependent leisure preference parameter is particularly interesting, as it generates a gradual 
decline in work hours and equity holdings with age, and a sensible dispersion in retirement 
ages which peak at age 62; these results are also consistent with empirical findings.3 
 Our work thus contributes to the portfolio choice, Social Security, and longevity risk 
management literatures. Many older finance research assumed that investors construct their 
portfolios independent of labor market influences, though a few authors do allow uninsurable 
labor income risk to shape household optimal consumption and investment decisions (Heaton 
and Lucas 1997; Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005) and they show how the 
optimal portfolio equity share falls with age due to the bond-like path of labor market 
earnings. Nevertheless, those authors maintain the exogeneity of labor supply. A few studies4 
have embedded flexible work hours into a continuous time portfolio choice model, but they 
assume, unrealistically, that the worker can fully insure labor income risk in the capital market 
(i.e. that wages are perfectly correlated with a set of traded risky securities). A recent paper by 
Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) analyzes endogenous work hours over the life cycle in a 
realistically calibrated portfolio choice discrete time model, but it requires the worker to 
mandatorily retire at a pre-specified age. Prohibiting consumers from controlling their 
retirement age is problematic, since working longer represents a key way in which older 
workers can react to unlucky shocks in both labor and capital markets (Mitchell and Fields 
1984). In addition, deciding when to retire and claim one’s Social Security benefits is one of 
the most important yet irreversible financial decisions that people make. Particularly in this 
current bear market, households may be able to hedge adverse capital market developments 
by increasing their work effort and by working longer. 
 A large literature in the public finance arena explores how consumption, saving, and 
work patterns respond to Social Security benefit incentives, but those studies do not devote 
much attention to portfolio investment behavior. Instead, that research takes seriously the way 
in which Social Security benefits depend on and/or influence retirement behavior. For 
instance, Laitner (2003) analyzes the effects of Social Security taxes and benefits on 
retirement ages, and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) offer an important empirical analysis of 
                                                          
3 See Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). 
4C.f. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Bodie, Detemple, Otruba, and Walter (2004); Dybvig and Liu 
(2004); and Fahri and Panageas (2007). 
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retirement patterns.5 Low (2005) and French (2005) investigate optimal consumption, saving, 
and labor supply patterns with stochastic and unspanned wages, but they abstract from the 
portfolio allocation problem. 
   A last literature on which we build analyzes the impact of longevity risk on life cycle 
portfolio management. These analyses demonstrate how investors chose between stocks, 
bonds, and survival-contingent payout streams or payout annuities, so as to optimize their 
saving and consumption patterns during retirement.6  Two studies integrate annuities into a 
realistically calibrated portfolio choice model (uninsurable labor income, uncertain life time, 
stochastic capital markets, borrowing constraints) over the full life cycle, but they do not 
endogenize the work hours or the retirement decision (Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 
2008; Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos 2008). Those authors demonstrate that annuities are 
valuable in that they offer investors the opportunity to give up liquidity in exchange for a 
survival-contingent premium known as the ‘survival credit.’ What remains to be done is to 
develop a realistically calibrated model with uninsurable labor income, uncertain asset returns, 
stochastic mortality, flexible hours, choice of retirement date, and variable as well as fixed 
annuities in the portfolio choice set. To this task we turn next. 
 
1. The Consumer’s Life Cycle Problem 
1.1 Preferences 
 We employ a discrete time model  1,...,0  Tt , where t refers to the individual's 
adult age (computed as actual age minus 19 assuming the relevant lifespan starts at age 20). 
The individual has an uncertain lifespan and may live for a maximum of T years (indexed 
from 1 to T). The parameter  denotes the (subjective) probability of surviving to period t + stp
1, given the consumer is alive at t. In the last period,  is equal to zero. Individual sTp 1
preferences are characterized by a CRRA utility function 

 111 )(1),( tCu ttt LCL defined 
over a consumption good and leisure, where the substitution between leisure and 
consumption takes the Cobb-Douglas form.7 
 The recursive definition of the value function is given by:  
                                                          
5 Other studies focus on the empirical analysis of retirement patterns; see Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva 
(2000) and Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008). 
6 See Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009), Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006), and Milevsky and 
Young (2007); a broad literature review appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008).   
7 Low (2005) uses this same formulation but his analysis of work patterns prior to retirement is silent on portfolio 
choices. In sensitivity analysis below, we also evaluate the trade-off between leisure and consumption using a 
modified Cobb-Douglas preference function as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008). 
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LCV  The parameter is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, and  < 1 is the time preference. Here Ct denotes the level of consumption and Lt is 
leisure at time t. Leisure is measured as a percent of available time and lies in the 
interval . The individual’s work hours are measured as a fraction of the total 1min  tLL
available time, i.e. tL1 , whereas after retirement, labor supply is equal to zero. In what 
follows, the minimum leisure time is set Lmin = 1/3; in other words, the maximal labor supply 
is 2/3 of available time. Leisure preferences are governed by the parameter α, where (for 
a higher value of α corresponds to an increasing (decreasing) marginal utility of leisure 
(consumption).8  Below we work with a fixed value for α, but in sensitivity analysis we also 
permit α to be age-dependent, so declining health at older ages may induce a lower valuation 
of leisure (c.f. Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva 2000). We abstract from bequests.9 
 
1.2 Labor and Retirement Income 
 Our model accounts for a flexible retirement age within the parameters generally 
adopted by the US Social Security system. That is, the worker can retire (consume full 
leisure) between the ‘early’ retirement age (ERA; set here to age 62) and the ‘latest’ 
retirement age (LRA; set here to age 70). The individual receives a real wage when working 
and decides what fraction of her time to devote to the job. This labor supply decision ( tL1 ) 
then influences gross labor earnings. Labor earnings is reduced by a given fraction of 
expenditures related to housing and other durables expenditures h(t). Also individuals must 
pay taxes on their labor earnings (after housing expenditures) according to the proportional 
rate . Thus after-tax disposable labor earnings during the work life (t < τ,lt ]70,...,63,62[ ) 
are given by: 
      ,exp11))(1( tttlt uEtwLtthY   
,1 ttt nEE     (2) 
where  is a deterministic function of wage rates with respect to age allowing for the  tw
                                                          
8 In the special case where α is zero, this is consistent with the conventional utility function used in many prior 
studies of life cycle portfolio allocation (c.f. Campbell and Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005; 
Viceira 2001; and Yao and Zhang 2005). 
9 Hurd (1989) estimates the strength for intentional bequest preference to be close to zero, and therefore 
concludes that for most households bequest is accidential.  
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empirically observed hump-shaped earnings profile.  is a permanent labor earnings tE
component with innovation , and  reflects a transitory shock uncorrelated with . The tn tu tn
logarithms of both  and  are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and tn tu
standard deviation of N  and U . The correlation between the permanent earnings and the 
stock market is denoted by n. In our discrete time model, τ is the endogenous retirement age 
which is treated as both a decision variable as well as a state variable, with nine possible 
values from age 62 to 70. 
 After retirement, the household receives after-tax benefits payments from Social 
Security defined as follows:10 
     NRAKrt FEtthY ,1))(1( 









K
t
K
L)  tw
1
1(

exp
, where 
       I  NRANRA NRAgNRAgF NRAI   (3)     21, exp exp
and where ζ is the Social Security replacement rate based on lifetime average earnings. Here 
 L1  stands for the average fraction of available time worked during the work life. The 
average lifetime earnings level is approximated by
 
  







 

K
1(
1

K
twL
t
exp)
 where K denotes 
the period in which the individual attains her normal retirement age (NRA). Social Security 
benefits are taxed at a rate which may be lower than the wage tax rate to account for rt
progressive taxation. I is an indicator function which identifies whether the individual retires 
at or prior to the NRA, or later.  is a factor which depends on the NRA and the NRAF ,
endogenous retirement age  . If the worker retires prior to the NRA, works as an NRAF ,
actuarial reduction factor permanently reducing benefit payments (here are positive 21 g and g
constant). If the consumer works after the NRA, the benefit is increased by the delayed 
retirement credit .NRAF ,
11 
                                                          
10 Our model assumes that people claim retirement benefits and move to full leisure at the same age; Coile, 
Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002) show that this is actually what most people do.  
11 We abstract from other institutional aspects of Social Security rules such as the earnings test for retirees who 
return to work after retirement. 
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1.3 Capital and Payout Annuity Market Parameters 
 The individual may access capital markets by investing in two different asset classes: 
riskless bonds and risky stocks. The real bond gross return is constant over time and denoted 
by Rf . The real gross risky stock return at time t is labeled Rt and evolves according to a 
geometric random walk with drift. This implies that the log-returns for stocks ln(Rt) are 
serially independent and identically normally distributed with mean µs and standard deviation 
σs. The return on assets is taxed at rate tc. We also include in the investment opportunity set 
variable payout life annuities where the payouts may reflect an underlying portfolio of 
equities or bonds (or both). These are insurance contracts between an annuitant and an insurer 
where the purchaser pays the insurer an initial premium At and receives a pre-specified 
number of fund units nt for life, conditional on survival. This is computed according to:  
    
T
ts
ts
a
t
a
tt AIR
stp
tntZA
1
11 1
),(
)()()1(  .    (4) 
Here δ is an expense or loading factor charged by the insurance company to cover 
administrative costs, and the price of a fund unit at time t is . Also  is the atZ  1),( s
t
a
t
a pstp
cumulative conditional survival probability for an individual age 19+t to survive until age 
19+s, and AIR is the assumed interest rate. The single-period survival probability  is atp
specified by a mortality table used by the insurance company and may differ from the 
individual's subjective survival probability . This allows us to model asymmetric mortality stp
beliefs and address the problem of adverse selection in the private annuity market. The 
survival-contingent income from the annuity is equal to , . The AIR att ZPˆt n  Tt ,...,1
determines how the number of fund units is supposed to change over time, according 
to
1
1 )1(
1






t
t AIR
nn ; it may be thought of as the pre-determined shrinkage rate for the 
number of fund units.  
 The process describing the value of the fund unit is as follows: 
  ,            (5) 
a
ttt RZZ 11  
where  ftatfat RRRR   11   is the growth rate of the asset underlying the fund, and where 
π a is the stock fraction chosen inside the variable annuity. The equation describing the 
evolution of payouts for a specific annuity may be written as: 
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 AIR
RPP
a
tt
t 

 1
ˆˆ 1
1
. 
(6) 
This equation highlights that the annuity payment rises when  > 1+ AIR; it falls when 
< 1+ AIR; and it is constant when = AIR.
a
tR 1
a
tR 1
a
tR 1
12  The classical annuity with lifelong fixed 
payouts results is a special case, whereby the portfolio inside the annuity is fully invested in 
bonds (i.e. πa=0) and the AIR is set equal to the riskless interest rate (i.e. 1 + AIR = Rf). 
 
1.4 Wealth Transition and Optimization 
 Each period, the household decides how to allocate its cash on hand, Wt, to bonds Bt, 
stocks St, purchase of payout annuities At, and consumption Ct. The budget constraint 
becomes: 
ttttt CABSW  . (7) 
With this investment and consumption strategy, next period’s wealth Wt+1 is given by: 
   (8) 1111 )()1)((   ttttccftsttt YPSBttRBRSW
where Pt+1 is the sum of annuity payments received from all previously-purchased annuities. 
Here Yt+1, which below we call labor income, is defined in equations (2) and (3) as labor 
earnings prior to retirement, and Social Security benefits after retirement. The recursive 
evolution equation for the sum of after-tax payouts from all previous annuities purchased can 
be written as: 13 
 
       1)1(11
),(
1 1
1
1
11 







 


  cftatfT
ts
ts
a
t
t
t tRRRAIR
stp
A
AIR
PP  ,  (9) 
 The individual’s optimization problem is now to maximize the utility in (1) with 
respect to the appropriate asset allocation between liquid bonds and stocks, illiquid annuities, 
consumption, leisure, and the retirement decision: 
   (10) t
ABSLC
V
ttttt
max
]70,...,63,62[,,,,, 
We rule out short-selling in stocks and bonds and preclude the household from borrowing 
against future labor, pension, and annuity income by imposing the non-negativity restrictions 
                                                          
12 A more detailed discussion of how AIR influence payout profiles appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and 
Stamos (2009). 
13 Here the annuities are held in a non-tax qualified account and interest earnings are taxed as capital gains at a 
rate below the tax rate on labor earnings but higher than the Social Security tax rate (i.e. tr < tc < tl). This is an 
approximation to the exclusion ratio approach implemented by the US tax authority adopted for computational 
simplicity; for more detail on annuity taxation, see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (1999) and 
Milevsky (2006). 
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  .0,,1,,  ttatatt BSA   
In our model, there are five state variables: cash on hand Wt, annuity payouts from previously 
purchased annuities Pt, the permanent labor earnings level , retirement age τ, and age t. To tE
reduce the problem by one state variable we normalize the continuous state variables cash on 
hand and annuity payouts with the permanent labor earnings component. Next we discretize 
the (normalized) continuous state variables and solve the optimization problem by backward 
induction in a four-dimensional state space. For computations, we use a  )(42)(30)(40 tPW 
grid space before and a )(9)(39)(30)(40  tPW  after ERA. For each grid point we 
evaluate the policy and value functions using Gaussian quadrature integration and cubic-
splines interpolation. 
 
1.5 Model Calibration 
 The individual’s lifespan is modeled from age 20 to 100 (T = 81). In our base case, 
preference parameters are set to standard values in the life cycle literature, namely a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 5 and a discount factor β = 0.97. The leisure 
preference value  is set equal to 0.59 in the base case, which is the mean of the age-
dependent profile used in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) and close to Laitner’s 
(2003) value of 0.63. The one-period survival rate  is calculated by the US 1996 population stp
2000 table for female. Later, in the sensitivity analysis, we vary both the preference parameter 
for risk aversion and for leisure.   
 The analysis also sets the mean equity log-return at µs = 3.01% and the corresponding 
volatility parameter σs = 19.34%, equivalent to a yearly expected gross real return of 1.05 and 
standard deviation of 20.5%; the assumed real riskless rate Rf  is 1.02, in line with current 
expectations. The deterministic component of the wage rate process follows Fehr, Jokisch, 
and Kotlikoff (2006), reflective of middle-income households. The standard deviations 
N and u  are equal to 10.95% and 13.89% (as reported in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 
2005, and used by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2008).  The correlation between stock 
returns and permanent and transitory earnings shocks n is set to zero, consistent with 
empirical evidence in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). Returns on assets are assumed to 
be taxed at 20%; labor earnings are taxed at 30% following Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 
(2008). Housing-related expenditures are modeled as in Gomes and Michaelides (2005). 
 In the base case, the model assumes that the worker has a fixed labor supply of 8 hours 
per day and works 5 days a week (this is relaxed subsequently). This is motivated by Laitner 
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(2003), who posits 112 waking hours per week, so a fixed 40-hour work week is equivalent to 
roughly one-third (0.36) time (i.e. 1 - Lt = 40/112). The average labor supply  is also set 
 L1
equal to the same fraction.  The Social Security benefit structure is similar to that in effect in 
the United States. The benefit replacement rate ζ is set to 0.55 as per Mitchell and Phillips 
(2006); the actuarial reduction rate for early retirement benefits is  and the 0713.01 g
delayed retirement crediting rate is 077.02 g  as in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva 
(2000). Social Security benefits are taxed at a rate of 15% as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 
(2008). To price the annuities, the assumed interest rate is set to 2%, the insurance loading 
factor δ is 2.38% (in line with industry leaders such as Vanguard), and we use conditional 
survival probabilities from the US 1996 female annuitant 2000 mortality table to account atp
for potential adverse selection in the voluntary annuity market. 
 
2. Results  
In what follows, we present three variants of our model so as to compare key 
outcomes of interest including saving and investment patterns, annuitization purchases, work 
hours, and retirement ages. First, we develop a base case where the consumer can elect her 
retirement age endogenously but cannot adapt work hours per week and lacks access to 
annuities. Second, we allow work hours to be endogenous; and finally, we introduce annuities 
into the picture.  To do so, we use the optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic 
optimization model and compute expectations using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations. 
Sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters is provided in Section 3.  
  
2.1 Fixed Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity  
 We analyze a moderately risk-averse worker (ρ=5) whose chooses her appropriate 
consumption, investment, and labor supply strategy given a fixed workweek (i.e. 40-hour 
week work) but able to select a retirement age endogenously. Figure 1 traces expected 
consumption, labor income, and saving patterns by age, as well as the Cobb-Douglas function 
of leisure and consumption which enters the utility function.  All values 
are normalized by the worker’s first-year labor income.  The results show that the household 
saves until age 47; liquid assets peak at age 55 in expectation when they amount to about 
eight times first-year labor income. Average labor income follows a hump-shaped pattern 
until age 65 and falls substantially when most households claim Social Security benefits at the 
endogenous retirement age. The consumption profile also drops sharply after age 65 and falls 

tttt LCLCF
 1),(
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thereafter, since households are willing to trade off purchased goods for leisure time once this 
is feasible. Nevertheless, the Cobb-Douglas function F which combines consumption and 
leisure is quite smooth over the life cycle, as should be expected.  Note that in expectation, the 
household would be anticipated to rationally exhaust its savings around the age of 80, relying 
fully on Social Security benefits after that.  
Figure 1 here 
 Figures 2 and 3 offer detailed insights into the household’s expected asset allocation 
patterns by age and retirement choices. Panel A in Figure 2 indicates that, in this environment, 
people will hold a very high fraction of their saving in stocks over the life cycle, conditional 
on having certain minimal level of saving. Even at age 80, the equity percent is still 97%. 
These equity fractions are considerably higher than reported in prior studies that do not allow 
endogenous retirement (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005; Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 
2008). The reason is that, here, households will react to adverse stock market developments 
by delaying retirement and saving more. Thus the inherent hedging possibility of labor supply 
allows the household to take on more financial risk until the oldest possible retirement age, 
70. Also in Panel B we show that the capital market participation rate of modeled households 
decreases sharply with age. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that about half of the modeled 
households (55%) participate in the capital market at age 70; by age 80, fewer than 10% do 
so. Such high levels of equity holdings and low participation rates are actually not realistic for 
the older population. For instance, the U.S. Social Security Administration (2009) reports that 
about 55% of the 80+-population still receives income from assets which amounts to 10% of 
total income. Most of the asset income results from interest payments, and only one fifth 
receive any income from stocks. Therefore the model predicted market participation rates are 
low compared to observed behavior, and equity fractions, conditional on participation, seem 
high.   
Figure 2 here 
 In Figure 3 we illustrate household work hours and retirement patterns. In this case, by 
assumption, the consumer works a 40-hour week work until retirement. As Panel A shows, 
labor supply patterns drop off as of the early retirement age of 62, and by age 66, all will have 
fully retired.  Panel B displays the fraction of people electing to retire at each age: the model 
predicts that 14% will retire early, and the majority leaves at age 66.  
Figure 3 here 
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2.2 Flexible Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity  
 Next we allow the household to also choose its work intensity in the pre-retirement 
period, whereby the maximal labor supply is 2/3 of available time; in our case this is 
equivalent to a maximum of 75 working hours per week (i.e. 112*2/3). Results appear in 
Figure 4, where we see that the household now saves much more than was true in Figure 1.  
Liquid assets now peak at earlier (at age 54 vs. 55 in Figure 1) and higher, amounting to over 
10 times first-year labor income. On average, consumption is higher early in the work life and 
it falls after the normal retirement age; the function F is again smoothed over the life cycle.   
Figure 4 here 
 Turning to equity market participation patterns, Figure 5 and Figure 2 are quite 
similar: people still hold a surprisingly high fraction of their saving in stocks conditional on 
participation in the capital market (5A) but few households actually hold stocks and bonds 
after retirement (5B). Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 3 reveals much more striking 
differences. The individual able to adjust her labor hours ends up working much more during 
her younger years, and then she gradually curtails labor effort after middle age. Essentially, 
she profits from working harder early in life, producing higher absolute saving and more 
capital market returns. Also, sharply different from the prior case, virtually all households 
work up to the normal retirement age; after that, households gradually reduce their working 
hours.   
 Overall, endogenizing both the retirement age and work hours permits the consumer to 
enjoy reduced hours at older ages, a pattern consistent with empirical evidence (Low 2005). 
Therefore this second model generates a relative realistic labor supply pattern, though 
predicted high equity holdings and low capital market participation patterns still appear 
inconsistent with observed behavior.  
Figures 5 and 6 here 
 
2.3 Flexible Hours, Flexible Retirement, and Fixed/Variable Payout Annuities  
 In a third scenario, we allow the household to not only select her work intensity and 
retirement age, but also to hold annuities as well as stocks and bonds. Figure 7 shows the 
expected life cycle profiles for the case where payout annuities are available; in Panel A the 
consumer may purchase fixed annuities, and in Panel B variable annuities.  The results show 
that saving levels in liquid stocks and bonds are lower than in the environment without 
annuities shown in Figure 4. Now the consumer saves about 20% less at the peak of lifetime 
saving since she has the opportunity to purchase annuities and receive the survival credit in 
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later life. In the fixed annuity world, the worker will gradually purchase annuities between 
ages 48 and 75; the buying peaks at age 62 (when she spends about 13% of first-year labor 
income). Yet annuity payouts are not large, and in old age, people again live mainly on Social 
Security benefits. By contrast, in the variable annuity world, consumers buy substantial 
amounts of variable annuities from age 40 to 67, and the purchasing peaks at age 47 (now, at 
190% of first-year labor income). Variable annuities then generate important levels of 
retirement income flows above and beyond Social Security benefits. 
Figure 7 here 
      Figure 8 depicts the household’s expected trajectory for the fraction held in liquid 
stocks and bonds, and in the fixed annuity, subject to having certain minimal levels of 
financial and annuity wealth. Panel 1A reports the expected trajectory for the fraction held in 
liquid stocks, bonds, and the fixed annuity; while Panel 2A plots the expected trajectory for 
the fraction held in stocks and bonds, inside and outside the variable annuity.  As before, 
liquid stocks are the most important investment vehicle early in life, but in midlife, the 
individual switches gradually out of equities into fixed annuities (1A) beginning around the 
early retirement age. By around age 80, the entire portfolio has been moved into fixed annuity 
holdings to take advantage of the survival credit. When the consumer can buy variable 
annuities, the same general pattern (2B) obtains but it begins much younger, at around age 45. 
The reason is that the illiquidity inherent in the variable annuity can be offset by flexibility in 
both working hours and the retirement age. Earlier purchases provide access to the survival 
credit and expected equity returns earlier in life.  
 Panels 1B and 2B of Figure 8 show the fraction of households not participating in the 
capital or annuity markets by age. While participation patterns by the young are virtually the 
same as before, there is a striking difference among the older population. Now most do not 
rely only on Social Security benefits; rather, they also receive income from purchased 
annuities.  This is very clear in the case of variable annuities (2B), where virtually all retirees 
optimally annuitize a portion of their wealth.  
Figure 8 here  
 Figure 9 traces out the pattern of work hours when annuities are available. Here we see 
that work hours are similar irrespective of the type of annuity provided, and similar to those 
without the annuity. Further, as before, people gradually reduce their working hours over 
time. But there are substantial differences in retirement patterns, as is clear from the 
retirement rate table. Without annuities, 11% of the workers retire at the age of 66 and some 
still work until age 70 (6B). With fixed annuities, retirement begins as early as age 62 and 
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18% have left by age 66; all have left the workforce by 68. Finally, with variable annuities, 
the distribution is shifted even earlier, with 60% having retired by age 66 and all having left 
by age 67.  In the US context, fixed payout annuities have been the product most widely sold 
in the past, with variable payout annuities growing in popularity only recently. Yet the evident 
appeal of the variable payout product suggests that these are likely to become more popular as 
the population ages. 
 Figure 9 here 
 Overall, then, people retire earlier because they can secure a “second income” from 
their annuity purchases to supplement their Social Security benefits.  In this case, 
endogenizing both work hours and retirement, and including annuities, the model generates 
hump-shaped work hour patterns, elderly equity holdings similar to those observed in the real 
world, and capital market participation patterns also consistent with empirical evidence.  
 
2.4 Welfare Analysis 
 Next we examine the impact on consumer welfare of adding labor supply flexibility 
and annuities to the opportunity set. 14  To do so, we show in Table 1 the changes in consumer 
wellbeing in two ways: standard consumption-equivalent variations or relative utility gains 
(Column a), and also gains relative to what consumer would be willing to give up as a percent 
of her first-year labor earnings (Column b). Welfare gains are computed with reference to the 
lifetime utility level of a consumer with fixed work hours and retirement age and who lacks 
access to annuity markets appear in Row (0).15  Row (1) depicts the case of a worker who has 
fixed work hours but a flexible retirement age; this additional degree of freedom with respect 
to leisure provides a rather substantial lifetime utility gain of 4.4%. This can also be measured 
as a 50% gain in his first-year labor income, versus the reference case.  In Row (2), the 
worker can adapt both her work hours and her retirement age; relative to the reference case, 
utility gains are even larger, at 6.6% of lifetime utility, equivalent to a 61% increase in her 
first-year labor income.  Rows (3 and 4) permit both flexible hours and retirement ages; in the 
former case, only fixed annuities are available, and in the latter case, variable annuities are 
also available. Here we see that utility gains rise further in a world with annuities compared to 
Rows (1 and 2) where the annuity market is shut down; in the most flexible case, Row (4), 
lifetime utility rises by 7%. 
Table 1 here 
                                                          
14 Computational details appear in the Technical Appendix. 
15 The consumption-equivalent variable in utility terms is a standard metric; we also present the worker’s first 
year of labor income as a metric for the welfare change as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).  
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 In sum, the marginal benefit from having access to annuities is positive and important 
in the life cycle context, as is labor market flexibility in the form of adjustable weekly hours 
of work and retirement age. We note that these increases in lifetime utility are computed from 
the vantage point of a 20-year old where labor market flexibility is a driver for boosting 
forward-looking lifetime utility. Prior research has demonstrated that, for an individual on the 
verge of retirement, access to annuities is similarly valuable (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, 
and Brown 1999; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009). 
 
3. Sensitivity Analyses 
 To assess how robust our results might be to alternative formulations of household 
preferences, we next explore several alternative formulations of key utility parameters, 
namely risk aversion and the value attached to leisure. Of particular interest are the effects on 
labor supply, work hours, and retirement ages, summarized in Figure 10 and Table 2. In 
addition, we evaluate the effects on asset allocation patterns and the likelihood of participating 
in the capital and annuity markets, reviewed in Tables 3 and 4. In all instances, the benchmark 
(Case 1) is designed so the worker may elect flexible work hours and retirement age, and she 
also has access to stocks, bonds, and fixed payout annuities. Variants include Case (2) which 
boosts leisure preferences (to α=0.8); Case (3) reduces the consumer’s risk aversion (to 
and Case (4) where risk aversion is increased (to  In Case (5) we use a modified 
Cobb Douglas (MDC) utility function which alters the relative weights on consumption and 
leisure. Specifically, the argument of the utility function is specialized to  
where α is set to 0.9 as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viciera (2008). In Case (6) we make  age-
dependent to allow the utility of leisure to deteriorate with poorer health at older ages (as in 
Rust et al. 2000). The leisure parameter (t) is given by =1-0.6/(1+t/50) where t is the 
period. In addition we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion to , a value in line with 
the economics literature.

ttttt LCLCF ),(
16  
Figure 10, Tables 2-3-4 here 
 Not surprisingly, labor supply patterns over the life cycle depend importantly on the 
way in which the utility function is formulated in Figure 10.  In the benchmark case of Figure 
10, the average worker starts out working over 40 hours per week and in her mid-30’s she 
peaks at just under 50 hours per week; thereafter work hours fall gradually until retirement in 
her late 60’s. Everyone has retired after age 68 (Table 2). By contrast, the leisure-lover (Case 
                                                          
16 See Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) who argue that the typical values used in the finance literature seem 
implausibly high.  
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2) works only about half-time over her entire worklife and leaves employment as early as 
possible; all such persons are fully retired by age 63.  Work hours in Case 3 and 4 are quite 
similar to those in the benchmark case, indicating that varying risk aversion does not much 
influence hours. Yet there are substantially different retirement age outcomes: the most risk 
averse consumer is also likely to work until forced out at age 70, whereas risk lovers have a 
more dispersed retirement age distribution (Table 2).  The pattern for Case 5 results in an 
unrealistically high level of work effort over the life cycle, in that young and middle-aged 
employees are predicted to work over 60 hours per week and must be forced to retire at age 
70. Finally, Case 6 with the age-dependent utility of leisure parameter results in young 
persons are taking on extremely high labor hour commitments, but their effort drops off as 
health problems set in. Additionally they are likely to retire early, with the witdrawal pattern 
peaking at age 62.  
 The portfolio implications of this robustness analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and 
4. For instance, the leisure lovers (those who worked relatively little during their youth) also 
tend to invest heavily in equity until late in life (Tables 3 and 4, Case 2). Those with lower 
levels of risk aversion are, not surprisingly, much more likely to invest in equity and virtually 
all are in the capital market even at older ages (Tables 3 and 4, Case 3); the natural 
comparison is with the highly risk averse consumer in Case 4 who exits equities in favor of 
annuities at a much younger age.  In Case 5, the asset allocation pattern seems quite 
reasonable: the worker starts with a high equity allocation and gradually moves into safer 
investments like bonds and annuities with age. We also note in Table 4 that this consumer has 
a high probability of participating in the financial market. Yet this seemingly realistic life 
cycle investment pattern stands in contrast to the unrealistically high and long worklife profile 
noted above, for this specification of preferences. Case 6 investment patterns are more 
consistent with priors, in that equity holdings are high for the young; during their 50’s, the 
consumer is expected to switch into bonds and annuities and by age 65 to hold virtually no 
risky assets. But now the work patterns are more realistic than the prior case, since effort 
drops off with age as health deteriorates and they also retire early. In addition, the retirement 
peak at age 62 is also quite realistic (Table 2).17  
  
 
4. Conclusion 
  This paper uses a realistically calibrated life cycle model to derive optimal work and 
                                                          
17Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) note two spikes in actual retirement patterns for US households: a main one at 
age 62, and a smaller one at age 65. Here we replicate two peaks, one at 62 and the secondary one at age 63. 
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retirement behavior, as well as consumption and investment strategy, taking into account 
stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior portfolio allocation studies assume that the 
retirement age is set exogenously and predict that older people will hold unrealistically high 
levels of equity. Yet using prior studies’ parameters, we show that few older persons will 
actually participate in the capital market at all, also incompatible with real-world evidence.
Making labor supply endogenous raises older persons’ equity share and substantially 
increases work effort of the young; it also affords significant lifetime welfare gains of 7% or 
more than 60% of first-year earnings. Introducing annuities then generates even more realistic 
models which permit earlier retirement and higher participation by the elderly in financial 
markets. Finally, our model with an age-dependent leisure preference parameter fits observed 
behavior remarkably well, incorporating a gradual decline in work hours and equity holdings 
with age, as well as a sensible dispersion in retirement ages which peak at age 62, consistent 
with the evidence. 
  Evidently, combining work, investment, and lifetime payouts offers better and more 
attractive ways to manage life’s many challenges. This is one reason that, though fixed payout 
annuities have been more prevalent in the marketplace to date, we anticipate investment-
linked payout annuities will become more popular as Baby Boomers age. 
 17
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Figure 1: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, and Saving over the Life 
Cycle: Fixed Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity 
Markets. The graph displays expected consumption C, saving S, and labor income Y as a 
multiple of first-year labor earnings over the life cycle. Also shown is the value F of the 
Cobb-Douglas function entering the utility function. Notes: The household has a moderate 
level of risk aversion  of 5 and a discount rate  of  0.97; the leisure preference parameter  
is 0.59. We use optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic optimization for a 
female with maximum lifespan of age 100; expectations are computed from 10,000 Monte 
Carlo simulations. 
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Figure 2: Asset Allocation and Capital Market Nonparticipation Patterns by Age, Given 
Fixed Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity Markets. 
Panel A depicts the expected fraction of stocks and bonds over the life cycle, conditional on 
having minimally positive saving. Panel B displays the fraction of households not 
participating in the capital market by age. Notes: See Figure 1. 
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Figure 3: Work Hours and Retirement Rates Over the Life Cycle Given Fixed Work 
Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity Markets. Panel A 
displays average hours worked per week from age 20 until 70 (the latest feasible 
retirement age). Panel B reports the percent of people retiring at each age from 62 to 70. 
Notes: See Figure 1.  
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Figure 4: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, and Saving over the Life 
Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity 
Markets. The graph displays expected consumption, saving, and labor income as a multiple 
of first-year labor earnings over the life cycle. Also shown is the value F of the Cobb-Douglas 
function entering the utility function. Notes: See Figure 1. 
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Figure 5: Asset Allocation and Capital Market Nonparticipation Patterns by Age, Given 
Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity Markets. 
Panel A depicts the expected fraction of stocks and bonds over the life cycle, conditional on 
having minimally positive saving. Panel B displays the fraction of households not 
participating in the capital market by age. Notes: See Figure 1. 
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Figure 6: Labor Supply over the Life Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous 
Retirement Age, and No Annuities. Panel A displays average hours worked per week from 
age 20 until 70 (the latest feasible retirement age). Panel B reports the percent of people 
retiring at each age from 62 to 70. Notes: See Figure 1.   
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A. With Fixed Payout Annuities B. With Variable Payout Annuities 
 
Figure 7: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, and Saving over the Life 
Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, with Fixed/Variable Payout 
Annuities. The graph displays expected consumption, saving, and labor income as a multiple 
of first-year labor earnings over the life cycle. Also shown is the value F of the Cobb-Douglas 
function entering the utility function. Notes: Annuities are priced using the US annuitant 2000 
mortality table (AIR = 2%, loading factor 1.0238). See also Figure 1. 
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(2) Variable Annuities 
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Figure 8: Asset Allocation and Capital Market Nonparticipation Patterns by Age, Given 
Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, with Fixed/Variable Annuities. 
Conditional on having minimally positive liquid saving and expected present value of annuity 
payouts, Panel 1A depicts the expected trajectory for the fraction held in liquid stocks and 
bonds, and in the fixed annuity; Panel 2A plots the expected trajectory for the fraction held in 
stocks and bonds, inside and outside the variable annuity.  Panels 1B and 2B display the 
fraction of households not participating in the liquid capital or annuity markets by age. Notes: 
See Figure 7. 
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Age 
Retirement Rate 
(%) 
  Fixed  Variable 
62  2.7  5.0 
63  2.0  3.4 
64  1.5  6.0 
65  0.5  3.8 
66  11.0  40.2 
67  39.2  41.6 
68  43.1  0 
69  0  0 
70  0  0  
A. Average Weekly Hours by Age  B. Retirement Rates by Age 
 
Figure 9: Labor Supply over the Life Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous 
Retirement Age, with Fixed/Variable Payout Annuities. Panel A displays average hours 
worked per week from age 20 until 70 (the latest feasible retirement age). Panel B reports the 
percent of people retiring at each age from 62 to 70. Notes: See Figure 7. 
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(1) CD: =0.59, =5
(2) CD: =0.8, =5
(3) CD: =0.59, =3
(4) CD: =0.59, =10
(5) MCD: =0.9, =5
(6) CD: : vary, =3
 
 
Figure 10: Labor Supply Patterns Over the Life Cycle for Alternative Utility Parameters 
Given Flexible Work Hours and Endogenous Retirement Age, with Fixed Payout 
Annuities. The Figure displays the average hours worked per week for six alternative utility 
function settings. Case (1) is the reference case with a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility function 
where α equals 0.59 and ρ is 5. Case (2) has  set at 0.8, i.e. the investor prefers to have much 
more leisure time. For Case (3), the investor becomes less risk-averse so ρ is 3, and more risk 
averse in Case (4) where ρ is 10. In Case (5) we use a modified Cobb-Douglas (MCD) with α 
set at 0.9 to capture a stronger leisure preference. For Case (6) we use an age-dependent  to 
allow for a gradual decline in the utility of leisure associated with poorer health at older ages; 
as in Buchinski et al. (2000). (t) is given by =1-0.6/(1+t/50), where t is the period. Notes: 
See Figure 7.  
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Work 
Hours 
Retirement 
Age 
Annuity 
Market   
Relative 
Utility Gains 
(%) 
Welfare Gain: % of 
1st yr Labor 
Income  
           (a)  (b) 
(0) Fixed  Fixed  No    Reference  Reference 
(1) Fixed  Flexible   No    4.4%  49.5% 
(2) Flexible  Flexible   No    6.6%  61.3% 
(3) Flexible  Flexible   Fixed    6.8%  61.4% 
(4) Flexible  Flexible   Variable     7.0%  62.4% 
 
Table 1: Calculation of Welfare Gains.  This table reports utility gains as consumption-
equivalent variations computed with reference to Row (0) which refers to the lifetime utility 
level of a consumer with fixed hours and retirement age, and lacking access to annuity 
markets. Rows (1 and 2) allow the worker to select a flexible retirement age but differ with 
regard to work hour flexibility.  Rows (3 and 4) have both flexible hours and retirement age, 
but in the former case fixed annuities are available, and in the latter case, variable annuities 
are available. The last column reports the fraction of the worker’s first year labor income he 
would give up, in exchange for the additional lifetime flexibility that would make him 
indifferent relative to the reference case. Notes: See Figure 7. 
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α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ
0.59 5 0.8 5 0.59 3 0.59 10 0.9 5 vary 3
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Retirement Ratio (%)
Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CD CD CD CD MCD CD
2.7 50.2 22.4 0.3 0.2 49.6
2.0 49.8 15.6 0.3 0.2 24.6
1.5 0 8.6 0.2 0.2 12.8
0.5 0 6.1 0.1 0.3 6.5
11.0 0 6.8 0.1 0.3 3.3
39.2 0 6.2 0.3 0.3 1.7
43.1 0 7.3 2.3 1.1 1.5
0 0 8.3 7.0 1.2 0
0 0 18.8 89.4 96.3 0  
 
Table 2: Retirement Rates for Alternative Utility Parameters Given Flexible Work 
Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and Fixed Payout Annuities. The table shows the 
stocks/bonds/annuities fraction at age 35, 50, 65 and 80 for the six alternative utility function 
settings described in Figure 10. Notes: See Figure 10. 
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α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ
0.59 5 0.8 5 0.59 3 0.59 10 0.9 5 vary 3
Stocks
Bonds
Annuities
Stocks
Bonds
Annuities
Stocks
Bonds
Annuities
Stocks
Bonds
Annuities 96.3
0 0 0 0 0
98.1 61.6 91.1 98.2 98.9
67.9 40.9
80
1.9 38.4 8.9 1.8 1.1 3.7
0
65
59.1
0 0 0 1 0 0
94.5 97.3 76.5 43.8 32.1
5.5 2.7 23.5 55.6
36.5 10.8
79.0
1.1 0.3 0.3 8.5 4.8 10.50
98.9 99.7 99.5 66.1 58.7
0 0 0.2 25.4
0 0 0 0 0 1.
97.5 98.7
0 0 0 1.1 2.5 0
CD CD CD MCD CD
35
100.0 100.0 100.0 98.9
Asset Allocation (%)
Age Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CD
2
3
 
Table 3: Expected Asset Allocation Patterns for Alternative Utility Parameters Given 
Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and Fixed Payout Annuities. The 
table shows the stocks/bonds/annuities fraction at age 35, 50, 65 and 80 for the six alternative 
utility function settings described in Figure 10.  Notes: See Figure 10. 
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α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ α ρ
0.59 5 0.8 5 0.59 3 0.59 10 0.9 5 vary 3
Mean
Standard Deviation
Mean
Standard Deviation 17.1% 15.5% 0.8% 0% 0% 0%
53.0% 18.8% 1.0% 0% 0% 0%
0.5%
Old: Age 65‐99
17.3% 0.1% 17.4% 13.1% 21.5% 0.5%
MCD CD
Young: Age 20‐29
Non‐Participation (%)
(6)
12.6% 0.1% 9.7% 7.5% 11.6%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CD CD CD CD
 
 
Table 4: Capital Market Nonparticipation Rates for Alternative Utility Parameters by 
Age, Given Flexible Labor Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and Fixed Payout 
Annuities.  The top panel depicts the mean and standard deviation of nonparticipation for 
young persons age 20 to 29 in the six alternative utility function settings described in Figure 
10. The second panel shows results for nonparticipation rates for persons age 65-99. Market 
participation rates are 100% for middle-aged individuals. Notes: See Figure 10.
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Technical Appendix: Calculating the Utility-Constant Equivalent Consumption Stream 
(CE) 
For each case, the expected lifetime utility from consumption and leisure at t=1 is given by: 
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where Ct and Lt are optimized in each model variant. In each case, we calculate the constant 
consumption stream CE for an investor with fixed work hours who retires at the normal 
retirement age and who does not have access to annuities. This constant consumption stream 
CE makes her as well-off in expected utility terms at age 20 as the leisure and consumption 
stream that can be financed by the life cycle strategy. CE is defined as follows: 
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